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APPORTIONMENT OF DIVIDENDS

KEY PROBLEMS IN THE APPORTIONMENT OF
INCREASE BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE INTERESTS
IN PERSONALTY*
Erwin Esser N emmerst

I

T has been said with some amount of truth that "Perhaps no other
question in the law of future interests has called forth such a
voluminous literature as the question of the allocation of dividends
and the other accruing benefits as between the life tenant and the
remainderman of shares of corporate stock.ni
The present writer's purpose in adding to the material on the
subject is to show the relation to the case law of the rules set forth
in the Restatement of Trusts and the Uniform Principal and Income
Act. While difficult problems of apportionment arise in regard to
realty, for instance in the distribution of the proceeds of sales, condemnation, insurance, and "wasting assets" (such as timber, minerals,
oil and gas), the problems in regard to personalty are perhaps even
more confusing. Today by far the most common forms of personalty
involved are corporate stocks and bonds, both of which readily lend
themselves to the creation of successive interests. Since the rules
applicable to corporate stock developed from those governing the
apportionment of the increase of animals and slaves and of receipts
from business, these earlier forms of personalty are considered first.
No attempt is made to discuss problems which are not peculiar to
personalty, but which apply the same principles that :_govern in the
case of land, such as the division of rents, sales, and proceeds from
"wasting assets" ( copyrights, royalties and patent rights), and problems of unproductive estates and the allocation of expenses.

I
THE GENERAL RULE

The general rule is simple enough. Income goes to the life tenant,
principal to the rtmainderman. 2 The difficulty lies in determining
*I am indebted to Professor A. James Casner of Harvard Law School for innumerable suggestions in the preparation of this paper.
tA.B., Marquette University; A.M., University of Chicago; L.L.B., Harvard;
author of various law review articles.-Ed.
l
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SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,

§ 692, P· 123 (1936).

The life tenant-remainderman situation being the most frequent, it will serve
as a model throughout this paper.
2
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what is income and what is principal. If one of the terms can be
completely defined, the balance must belong to the other category.
Presumably the easier term to define would be principal since that is
the amount fixed at the creation of the interests, and once that is
deter-mined the rest constitutes the accretions. At the outset there is
a basic difficulty. Is a certain res or a quantum meant when principal
at the creation of the interest is spoken of, e.g., is a piece of land which
may rise and fall in value ( a res) or the value of that land at the
creation of the interests ( a quantum) meant? 3 In the case of land it
would seem clear that a res is meant. Yet in dealing with stocks ~nd
bonds, courts often seem to think they are dealing with an initial
quantum of value rather than with a res. The question will be- considered in detail when apportionment of corporate dividends is considered.
The intent of the creator of the future interests, as expressed in
the deed or will, governs in respect to the distribution of the increase.4
The present paper deals with cases where the intent is not manifest.
The law supplies not what it thinks the testator's intent was but what
it thinks would have been his intent if it had been called to his attention
to provide for apportionment.
The great majority of the cases of apportionment of income deal
with the situation of life tenant and vested remainderman. There is
no reason to distinguish this situation from the case of a preceding
estate for years followed by remainder interests. However, it is conceivable that a different view might be taken in the case of a contingent
remainderman or of a defeasible owner who is subject to an executory
interest. The reasoning would be that since the future interests in
such cases may never come into enjoyment, the possessory owner ought
to be allowed to enjoy all the increase, subject at most to a bond to
insure the future interests if they do come into possession. This argument does not carry weight as to the contingent remainderman, because
his interest is followed by a reversion or other vested interest either of
which must eventually come into enjoyment. As to the executory
interest, the likelihood of its coming into possession would of course
depend on the condition. It would be unwise to distinguish on the
basis of conditions and unfair not to do so. As to rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter in personalty ( which are doubtful interests in
personalty5 ) the same problem would arise. It is submitted that no
See Isaacs, "Principal-Quantum or Res?" 46 HARV. L. REV. 776 (1933).
Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545, 28 A. 565 (1894); Reed v. Head, 6 Allen
(88 Mass.) 174 (1863); In re Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 67 A. 775 (1907).
5 See I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 212, 213 (1936).
8
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distinction should be made in the general rules on the basis of the form
of the interest.6
Attempts to distinguish between legal and equitable future interests in personalty in the matter of apportionment raise somewhat the
same problem. Various distinctions have been suggested.7 Again, it
is submitted, uniformity has its advantages. So similar are the rules
concerning legal and equitable interests that the Restatement of Property by remaining silent has so far chosen to and will likely continue
to follow the principles laid down in the Restatement of Trusts. 8
The Uniform Principal and Income Act draws no distinction between
legal and equitable interests in this respect. 9
In the earlier (pre-eighteenth century) English law, problems of
apportionment of accretions did not frequently arise. Land was the
chief form of wealth and caused little difficulty on this point. What
personalty there was consisted mainly of plate, paintings, heirlooms and
household goods. If the goods were not consumables, the future interests were valid and the income and principal problem was easy
because there was none. The earliest difficulties arose with the increase
of animals and slaves and with businesses. With these two exceptions
the problem of apportionment awaited the nineteenth century and the
development of corporations.10

II
INCREASE OF ANIMALS AND SLAVES

This discussion is based on the assumption that animals and slaves
are not consumables.11 If they are consumables, there would be no
future interests. The general rule as to animals is that the life tenant
6 It may be noted that the present problem is not the same as that of security for
a holder of a future interest in personalty. See Nemmers, "Right of Owner of Future
Interest in Personalty to Security," 1943 Wis. L. REV. (March).
7 See, e.g., 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 1261, 1265 (1939).
8 l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236 (b) (1935).
9 1931 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. CoMMRs. UNIFORM STATE LAws 328-337;
9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED. But l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§ 236 (1935), disagrees
in the matter of corporate dividends in general with the Uniform Law. See infra,
section on corporate dividends.
10 Actually the first case on- corporate dividends was Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves.
Jr. 800, 31 Eng. Rep. 414 (1799).
11 Cf. Patterson v. Devlin, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 459 (1827), as to whether slaves
are consumables. For a treatment of the general subject, see Nemmers, "Consumables
in the Law of Future Interests," 27 MARQ. L. REv. 82 (1943). A trustee may be under
a duty to sell and invest the proceeds. See 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 223 (1936).
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is entitled to the offspring.12 Afcording to Chancellor Kent1 8 the rules
came from the Roman law and then "By means of Bracton they were
introduced into the common law of England, and, doubtless, they now
equally pervade the jurisprudence of these United States." Thus one
who hires sheep gets the increase during the term.14 But the termor
or life tenant had first to replace any depletions in the stock before he
could keep the balance, as the civil-law rule provided.15 Some states
require no replacement.16
The Uniform Principal and Income Act, section 8,11 makes three
, points. Where animals are employed in business, section 7 relating to
principal used in business applies. Where "the animals are held as a
part of the principal partly or wholly because of the offspring or 'increase which they are expected to produce," the increase is principal
to the extent necessary to maintain the original number and the balance
is income. Thirdly, in all other cases increase is income.
·The rule was long contra as to slaves, it being held that the increase went to the remainderman. As Kent says:18 "The Roman Law
made a distinction in respect to the offspring of slaves . . . and so does
the civil code of Louisiana" and this was carried over into the American
law 19 except that at least Delaware, Maryland and New York adopted
12 Only the case of first instance in a jurisdiction is given: Leonard v. Owen, 93
Ga. 678, 2,0 S.E. 65 (1894); Milner v. Brokhausen, 153 Iowa 560, 133 N.W. 1068
(1912); Davison's Admr. v. Davison's Admx., 149 Ky. 571, 149 S.W. 982 (1912);
Lewis v. Davis, 3 Mo. 133 (1832); Perry v. Terrel, I Dev. & B. Eq. (21 N.C.)
441 (1836); Holman's Appeal, 24 Pa. 174 (1854); Patterson v. Devlin, McMul.
Eq. (S.C.) 459 (1827); Huntv. Watkins, I Humph. (20 Tenn.) 498 (1840); Wagnon v. Wagnon, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 16 S. W. (2d) 366; Dunbar's Exrs. v. Woodcock's Exr., IO Leigh 628, 37 Va. 660 (1840). As usual, a contrary intent will
govern: Major v. Herndon, 78 Ky. 123 (1879); Flowers v. Franklin, 5 Watts (Pa.)
265 (1836).
18 2 KENT, CoMMENTARIES, 1st ed., 294 (1827).
14 Wood v. Ash, Owen 139, 74 Eng. Rep. 958 (1586); Putnam v. Wyley, 8
Johns. (N. Y.) 432 (1811).
'
15 Holma,n's Appeal, 24 Pa. 174 (1854); Patterson v. Devlin, McMul. Eq. (S.C.)
459 (1827); Hunt v. Watkins, I Humph. (20 Tenn.) 498 (1840); Wagnon v.
Wagnon, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 16 S.W. (2d) 366; Dunbar's Exrs. v. Woodcock's
Exr., IO Leigh 628, 37 Va. 660 (1840); In re Powell, [1921] 1. Ch. 178.
16 Leonard v. Owen, 93 Ga. 678, 20 S.E. 65 (1894) (under statute); Lewis v.
Davis, 3 Mo. 133 (1832); Saunders v. Haughton, 8 Ired. Eq. (N.C.) 217 (1852);
Forsey v. Luton, 2 Head (39 Tenn.) 183 (1858).
.
17 1931 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. CoMMRS. UNIFORM STATE LAWS 332.
This
section was added by the third and· final draft of the act. For a list of the states
which have adopted this Uniform Act, see infra, note 129.
18 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 1st ed., 294 (1827).
19 Strong's Exrs. v. Brewer, 17 Ala. 706 (1850); Murphy v. Riggs, I A.K.
Marsh (8 Ky.) 532 (1819); Glasgow v. Flowers, I Hayw. (2 N.C.) 233 (1795),
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the same rules for slaves as for animals.20 Most courts assign humanitarian reasons for the exception in the case of slaves, the effort being to
keep the mother and children together. Other courts21 ascribe it to
custom.

III
DIVISION OF RECEIPTS FROM BUSINESS

Where a business is left in trust or directly with the direction to
continue its operation, the life tenant is entitled to the net profits from
the business.22 If such profits are plowed back into the business, they
then go to the remainderman.28
An increase in the invested capital is ordinarily held to go to the
remainderman,24 although where the business itself consists of buying
and selling, the increase in the value of the stock in trade is income.25
Under the view of the Restatement of Trusts 26 and the provisions
of section 7 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the problem is
solved in the same manner except that the Restatement is silent at one
point. If the trustee or life tenant is authorized to continue the business, the net profits are income. Net profits in the case of a business
consisting of buying and selling 21 are determined by deducting from
gross returns plus inventory at the ending of the period the expenses
and inventory at the beginning of the period. The Uniform Act prociting Tims v. Potter, 1 Martin, 22, 1 N. C. 12 (1789); Tidyman v. Rose, Rich.
Eq. Cas. (S.C.) 294 (1831); Wirt v. Cannon, 4 Cold. (44 Tenn.) 121 (1867);
Carter v. Webb, Jeff. (Va.) 123 (1772); Preston v. McGaughey, (C. C. Tenn,
1812) F. Cas. No. u,397.
20 Smith v. Milman, 2 Har. (2 Del.) 497 (1839); Scott v. Dobson, l Harr. &
McH. (Md.) 160 (1749); Concklin v. Havens, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 314 (1815);
Lattimer v. Elgin, 4 Desauss. (S.C.) 26 (1809), applying Maryland law.
21 Tims v. Potter, 1 Martin 22, 1 N.C. 12 (1789).
22 Skirving v. Williams, 24 Beav. 275, 53 Eng. Rep. 363 (1857); In re Rogers,
37 Misc. 54, 74 N.Y.S. 829 (1902).
.
28 Wakefield v. Wakefield, 32 Ont. 36 (1900); Brown v. Gellatly, L.R. 2 Ch.
751 (1867).
2 <lVan Blarcom v. Dager, 31 N.J. Eq. 783 (1879); In re Chalfant's Estate,
294 Pa. 331, 144 A. 134 (1928); Smith v. Sweetser, (C.C.A. 7th, 1927) 19 F.
(2d) 974. But cf. infra where in considering corporate dividends the rule is contra
in many states.
25 Ruppert v. McArdle, 42 App. D.C. 392 (1914).
26 l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 233, comment (c) (1935).
21 l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 233, comment (c) (1935), explicitly mentions
manufacturing. The Uniform Principal and Income Act is probably broad enough to
include manufacturing also where the prime function of the business is not trading
itself (in fact the business may deal in futures in order to avoid the risks of trading)
but manufacturing.
'
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vides 28 and the Restatement is silent on the point 29 that where the business does not consist of buying and selling property, "the net income
shall be computed in accordance with the customary practice of such
business but not in such way as to decrease the principal." The final
provision (and the Uniform Act and the Restatement concur) is that
any increase in the value of the principal used in the business is principal, and losses in any one year after the income from that year has
been exhausted fall on principal. _
The loss provision is clear enough; there is no need to distinguish
between capital losses and operating losses because both fall on the
remainderman. But by making a year to year accounting provision,
injustice may be done if profits and losses fluctuate from year to year.
Should not the remainderman be permitted to carry over losses? 29 a
The case is di:fferent with regard to gains; capital gains go to the
remainderman, operating gains go to the life tenant. The problem
of distinguishing the two is the same as that 'involved in the question
discussed in the next section of this paper, "How shall extraordinary
dividends be apportioned?" since that answer also requires a distinction
between capital gains and operating gains.30

IV
DIVISION:_ OF CORPORATE DIVIDENDS

A.

In General
As has been pointed out above 31 the subject of the division of
corporate dividends between life tenant and remainderman has been
regarded as one of the most prolific problems in the law. Numerous 32
1931 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. CoMMRs. UNIFORM STATE LAws 332, § 7 (3).
But 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 233.1, p. 1259 (1939), follows the Uniform Act.
29 a The Restatement does not provide for an annual accounting period in determining profit and loss.
·
so This problem, considered by the Uniform Act and the Restatement, existed
in the case law in much the same form with regard to the division of the receipts
from business. A separate analysis at this point would be useless duplication.
31
See opening paragraph of this paper.
·
32
The cases are collected in: 13 A.L.R. 1004 (1921); 24 A.L.R. 9 (1923);
42 A.L.R. 448 (1926); 50 A.L.R. 375 (1927); 56 A.L.R. 1315 (1928); 59 A.L.R.
1532 (1929); 72 A.L.R. 981 (1931); 77 A.L.R. 753 (1932); 81 A.L.R. 542
(1932); 83 A.L.R. 1261 (1933); 99 A.L.R. 518 (1935); 101 A.L.R. 1379 (1936);
109 A.L.R. 234 (1937); 113 A.L.R. 1193 (1938); 115 A.L.R. 881 at 889 (1938);
126 A.L.R. 1298 (1940); 129 A.L.R. 1314 at 1336 (1940); 130 A.L.R. 492
(1941); 118 Am. St. Rep. 162 (1908); 12 Ann. Cas. 650 (1909); Ann. Cas. 1912B
28

29
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collections of cases and law review notes and articles 33 bear witness.
A number of situations are possible: dividends may be in cash or
stock, may be earned and/or be paid completely within the life tenancy
or only partially during that time and dividends may be regular,
extraordinary or liquidating. It seems natural that different answers
should be reached with so many variations possible. And this the more
so since the corporate dividend cases in this country had no precedents
in. England forming a continuous and logical system to guide them.
On only one situation are all jurisdictions agreed: when a dividend
is regular, paid in cash, declared and earned during the life tenancy,
the dividend is income and belongs to the life tenant. Generally,
ordinary dividends go to the holder on the record date or date of
declaration.34 Since no problems are raised in this connection, most of
the present discussion is devoted to extraordinary dividends.
Beyond that, the theories and rules-and there are two theories
and four rules 35 with many hybrids-vary. One theory suggested is a
quantum theory, which involves determining the market value of the
stock at the time of the creation of the interests. This gives the
quantum which eventually will be turned over to the remainderman.
Such a concept would eliminate any possibility of gain and much of the
chance for loss for the remainderman. He would always have a claim
against the life tenant in the amount of the original valuation and any
decrease in this value would have to be made up by the life tenant out
of income, even to completely exhausting the income in so doing. In
this pure form the principle has never been adopted despite its logical
nicety. The Kentucky rule 36 comes closest to this by giving the life
1218; Ann. Cas. 1915A 311; 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 768 (1908); 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 563
(1912); 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 510 (1914); 7 R.C.L. 289 (1915).
33
The references to law review articles and notes are too numerous to be set
out here. The better references are collected in 3 S1MEs, FuTURE INTERESTS, § 692,
note 14 (1935). To these may be added the numerous case notes in the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review. The corporate dividend question has arisen most often
and in the most varied forms in Pennsylvania.
34
But in New Jersey all dividends are apportionable, being treated like interest.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Lobdell, 116 N.J. Eq. 363, 173 A. 918 (1934). The reason
usually given [see Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857), the leading American case] is
that ordinary dividends are so small and the interval of time between them is so small
as not to do great injustice by holding that they go to the owner of the stock on the
day of declaration or the day of record designated by the directors.
35
The quantum and res theories and the English, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
and Kentucky rules.
36
See infra, the section on the Kentucky rule.
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tenant all dividends, but it does not make the life tenant liable for
any decrease in value.
The other is the res theory, which causes no end of difficulty. In
the case of future interests in land the res is clear. But what is the
res in the case of corporate shares? One answer might be the shares
themselves. The life tenant receives a number of shares. These are
not considered as so much par value but as so many segments of the
corporate corpus. This concept has not been adopted in the full sense
but there are waverings in that direction by some courts.37
The quantum theory ·is basically inequitable in giving the life
tenant all the dividends without requiring him to bear any of the capital loss and the res theory is abstractly the better of the two. But such
a statement assumes criteria. Tentatively ado_pted as criteria are these
three tests: (I) the extent to which the rule approximates the probable
intent of the testator, (~) the equity of the rule, and (3) the facility of
application of the rule. It may be that (I) and ( 2) are only one test.
The four case rules briefly stated are: English rule sa that all
ordinary dividends, whether cash or stocks, go to the life tenant, all
extraordinary dividends go to the remainderman; Pennsylvania rule 39
that regular dividends go to the life tenant, extraordinary dividends
are apportionable to the life tenant in so far as earned during the life
tenancy, otherwise to the remainderman; Massachusetts·rule 40 that all
cash dividends go to the life tenant, all stock dividends to the remain87 Something of this concept is present in the rule that profits from businesses go
to the life tenant but an increase in the value of the "capital" goes to the remainderman.
There is a basic inequity in never requiring the life tenant to bear any of the
capital loss, yet allowing him to take all the dividends (Kentucky rule) and in _even
refusing to give the remainderman part of the increase in the value of the "capital."
(Neither the . English, Pennsylvania or Massachusetts rules distinguish between
"profits" resulting from earnings in ordinary business operations and "profits" resulting
from asset revaluation or from "capital gains.") But see infra the· discussion under
the Pennsylvania rule.
·
The quantum conception can be a doubfo-edged sword. If affairs prosper, it
favors the life tenant, but if res adoersae sunt it strikes the life tenant. Perhaps this
has made the courts reluctant to follow the logic of either the res or the quantum
theory, especially where widows and orphans are most often the life tenants.
The economic basis for the inequity of the quantum theory lies partly in the fact
that the purchasing power of money fluctuates.
88 First stated in Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. Jr. 800, 31 Eng. Rep. 414 (1799).
The rule is not followed in this country.
89 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857). For list of states following Pennsylvania,
see infra, note 60.
·
40 Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI ( 1868).
For list of states following Massachusetts, see_ infra, note 91.
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derman; and the Kentucky rule that all dividends of every kind go to
the life tenant.41
The Restatement of Trusts 42 adopts the Pennsylvania rule and the
Uniform Principal and Income Act adopts the Massachusetts rule. 48

B. The English Rule
The English rule that ordinary dividends go to the life tenant
while extraordinary dividends go to the remainderman stems from
the earliest case on the division of corporate dividends between principal and income, Brander v. Brander.44 In that case a bank advanced
£1,000,000 to the government and received £1,125,000 of five per
cent annuities which were distributed among the stockholders. The
testator had previously devised his bank stock to A for life, then over.
The court held the twelve and one-half per cent increment went to
the remainderman and the five per cent interest to the life tenant
annually. The court made no analysis of the testator's probable intent
or of the matter of convenience. Nor did the court expressly use the
language of ordinary and extraordinary dividends.
Five years later the problem was again raised in Paris v. Paris,4 5
where Lord Eldon followed Brander v. Brander but was dissatisfied
41
Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Exr., 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892). This is
equivalent to solving the problem by denying its existence. This rule seems also to
be followed in Delaware, see infra, note 102.
42
1 TRUSTS R.EsTATEMENT, § 236 (1936). This was § 228 in Tentative Draft
No. 4 (1933).
48
·
1931 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. CoMMRS. UNIFORM STATE LAws 329-330,
§ § 3, 5.
44
4 Ves. Jr. 800, 31 Eng. Rep. 414 (1799). Substantially the same situation
arose in the House of Lords in 1803 in the case of Irving v. Houstoun, 4 Paton (Scot.
App. Cas.) 521 (1803), and the rule was affirmed, Lord Eldon saying at p. 530: "These
[decisions] have been followed in all cases where bonuses have been divided in the
Court of Chancery among factors and wards, the number of which cases is very great
indeed: in all these, such bonuses [i.e., extraordinary dividends] have been held an
accretion to the capital."
·
The case of Brander v. Brander had been decided by Lord Rosslyn, who also
took part in the discussion of Irving v. Houstoun. It came out in the discussion of
Irving v. Houstoun that Lord Rosslyn was inclined to the Pennsylvania rule, but had
been thwarted by the objections of the bank to a determination of what part of the
dividends was earned before and what after the death of the testator. At p. 531,
Lord Rosslyn says ''When I first came to consider the case of Brander v. Brander,
I thought it would be necessary to learn what part of the bonus had accumulated
before the testator's death, and what part since that period, to do justice between the
claimants. The bank were [sic] very much alarmed when I hinted any intention of
this kind. Upon considering this matter maturely in all its consequences, the judgment was pronounced in that case, holding the bonus to be an accretion to the capital."
45
IO Ves. Jr. 185, 32 Eng. Rep. 815 (1804).
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with its result. He saw no reason to distinguish between cash and stock
dividends 46 and seemed inclined to the view that the time when the
dividend was earned should be the test. 47 Thereafter the rule was
repeatedly followed and became firmly established.48 The problem
was re-examined.in 1887 in Bouch v. Sproule;10 where Lord Herschell
said: 50 "But a disposition was early shown to limit the operation of the
rule laid down in Brander v. Brander, and adopted by this House; and
it is manifest that from the first it was felt not to rest on any stable
principle." The question in Bouch v. Sproule was whether sufficient
counter authority existed to reverse or greatly confine the scope of the
rule in Brander v. Brander. 51 The case of Bouch v. Sproule, however,
46

Thereby condemning the Massachusetts rule.
Thereby favoring one element of the Pennsylvania rule. On this cf. Lord
Rosslyn's attitude, supra, note 44.
48
Clayton v. Gresham, IO Ves. Jr. 288, 32 Eng. Rep. 855 (1804); Witts v.
Steere, 13 Ves. Jr. 363, 33 Eng. Rep. 330 (1807); Ex parte Hodgens, I I Irish Eq. 99
(1847).
49
12 App. Cas. 385 (1887), reversing In re Bouch, 2<} Ch. Div. 635 (1885).
50
12 App. Cas. at 395.
51
This involves some consideration of previous attempts to reduce the scope of
the rule.
In Barclay v. Wainewright, 14 Ves. Jr. 66, 33 Eng. Rep. 446 (1807), a 5o/o
semiannual dividend was involved. The ordinary dividend was 3¼ % and the argument was that the difference must be treated as principal. But Lord Eldon again
showed his inclination for the Pennsylvania rule by saying ( 14 Ves. Jr. at So): "If it
is contended that any part of the 5 o/o is given out of, or to be paid from, capital, a case
must be brought before the Court, either making that out by evidence, or under
circumstances forming a fair ground for inquiry." The dividend was held to be
income_. The same result was reached in Preston v. Melville, 16 Sim. 163, ·60 Eng.
Rep. 835 (1848). The result seems to throw the burden on the party asserting the
dividend is principal. But cf. Ward v. Combe, 7 Sim. 634, 58 Eng. Rep. 981
(1836), with Price v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 473, 60 Eng. Rep. 703 (1847), and the
reconciliation attempted in Bouch v. Sproule, discussed supra. The court in Bouch
v. Sproule found that these two decisions did not create a limitation on Brander v.
Brander. However, Lord Herschell did state in Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385
at 397 (1887), that Irving v. Houstoun was "an authority governing only a case
similar in its facts; that is to say, a case where the company has no power to increase
its capital, but has accumulated profits and used them, in fact, for capital purposes,
and afterwards distributes these profits amongst the proprietors."
A strong limitation on the rule to the same effect, viz: that it apply only to cases
where the company cannot increase its stock, is also filed by Lord Watson. He said,
I 2 App. Cas. at 401: "The company has likewise under its articles the power, which
it exercised in I 872, of increasing its capital by the creation and allotment of new
shares to its members according to their respective interests, and of crediting them
with a sum as paid on each share from its reserved or undivided profits. It is also
worthy of observation . . . that the books of the company were kept, and the annual
balance-sheets issued to the shareholders prepared in such a form as to disclose the
precise amount of profit and loss upon each year's trading; and that the parties have
47

1 943]

APPORTIONMENT OF DIVIDENDS

rests on the question of authority in the charter of the corporation to
designate a fund as increased capital. Should this be binding as to a
dispute between life tenant and remainderman?
The earlier English law refused to apportion the extraordinary
dividend between life ten~nt and remainderman ( as would be done
under the Pennsylvania rule), holding that the dividend arises when
it is declared. 52 This was changed by statute after the date of the will
but before the death of the testator in Jones v. 0 gle 53 and the court
held the statute did not apply. The statute was the Apportionment
Act of r 870 54 and provided that dividends were to be considered as
accruing like interest from day to day.
It seems clear that the English course is directed to the Pennsylvania rule, both by a groping case law and by statute.
By the threefold test of simplicity, testator's probable intent and
equity, the "old" English rule that ordinary dividends go to the life
tenant and extraordinary dividends go to the remainderman commends
itself on all three grounds though it is less equitable to use an ordinaryextraordinary division than to divide an extraordinary dividend on a
basis of earnings before and after the inception of the life tenancy. It
is definitely more equitable than the formalistic cash-stock basis of
division under the Massachusetts rule.
consequently been enabled to state in their joint case the exact proportion of the
reserved profits in question which accrued during the currency of the life tenant's
right."
52
Jones v. Ogle, L.R. 8 Ch .. 192 (1872). But in Maclaren v. Stainton, 27 Beav.
460, 54 Eng. Rep. 182 (1859), a dividend on shares declared after the testator's death
was held to be part of his residue estate.
53
L. R. 8 Ch. 192 (1872).
54
33 & 34 Viet., c. 35 (1870). Section 2 provides: "From and after the passing
of this Act, all rents, annuities, dividends, and other periodical payments in the nature
of income (whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing or
otherwise) shall, like interest on money lent, be considered as accruing from day to
day, and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly."
Section 5 provides: "The word 'dividends' includes (besides dividends strictly
so called) all payments made by the name of dividend, bonus or otherwise out of the
revenue of trading or other public companies, divisible between all or any of the
members of such respective companies, whether such payments shall be usually made
or declared at any fixed time or otherwise ...."
The same result has been reached in New Jersey without a statute. Lang v. Lang's
Exr., 57 N.J. Eq. 325, 41 A. 705 (1898).
Under this statute it has been held that where an ordinary dividend is declared
shortly after the creation of the trust for a period partly before the creation of the
trust, it is apportionable between the testator's estate and the life beneficiary. In re
Oppenheimer, [1907] I Ch. 399. Cf. In re Muirhead, [1916] 2 Ch. 181.
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C. The Pennsylvania Rule

The leading American case is Earp's Appeal,5 5 which established
the Pennsylvania rule of distribution on the basis of the source of the
dividend-whether from principal or income. Stocks were left in
trust for life with power in the life tenant to appoint in remainder.
The corporation had been formed in I 83 9 with $100,000 capital. The
testator died in 1848. Charters ran for twenty-five years by act of
the Assembly._ In I 845 the capital was increased to $200,000 by issuing a one hundred per cent stock dividend. In 1854 a three hundred
per cent stock dividend increased the capital to $500,000. Three months
later when the executor :filed the account, the problem was presented
whether these last shares bdonged to, income or principal. On July 1,
1848, the surplus was $249,000. The testator died in November,
1848, and January 1, 1848, the surplus was $300,000. On July 1,
1854, the surplus was $714,000 and on July IO, 1854, a stock dividend
of $300,000 was declared. At the time of the death of the ·testator the
surplus app~oximated $300,000, which was later paid out as a stock ·
dividend of $300,000. The case seems to apply a quantum theory,
taking the value at the death of the testator as that to which the remainderman was entitled. Beyond that all went to the life tenant. fis
The court says:
" ... Their [the life tenants'] interests commence after the
death of the testator. They have no right whatever to. claim the
'income' which had accumulated before his death .... It is equally
clear that the profits arising since the death of the testator are
'income' within the meaning of the will, and should be distributed
among the app~llants." 57
The case is at loggerheads with the common-law rule that a
dividend is not earned until declared and this was the basis of the life
tenants' claim here: since the declaration was after the death of the
·testator, it was argued that it was earned after the death of the testator
and therefore income. The court found that rule based on convenience
and "subject to exceptions wherever the purposes of justice require
th~ correction of injuries arising from the uniformity of the law." The
1

28 Pa. 368 (1857).
The court took the value of the shares at the time of death as $67,500 (540
shares at 125). After the dividend the value was $108,000 (1,350 shares at 80) of
which the remaindennan was entitled to $67,500 (or 844 shares) and the life tenant
to $40,500 (or 506 shares).
57 28 Pa. at 374.
55
56
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court adopted the analogy that interest was considered earned from
day to day. 58 The rule of convenience was to apply only where the
dividends were small and regular. Then they were earned when
declared. 59
The Pennsylvania rule is followed in some form in ten states
and Hawaii.60 There are variations of the Pennsylvania rule. 61 The
form stated by Earp's Appeal is the most common: all increase in the
value of the shares after the effective date of the instrument goes to
the life tenant, the book value of the shares at the date of creation goes
to the remainderman even though the surplus be distributed at a later
date in the form of a dividend. Th~s is the quantum view.
Applying the res view to the Pennsylvania rule, the remainderman
is entitled to the general assets as they exist at the date of creation, not
merely their value. The difference is brought out clearly in an illusCf. § 2 of the English statute to the same effect, supra, note 54.
The Pennsylvania court considered the English rule as arbitrary, and cited
Lord Eldon's dissatisfaction with it as an original matter [in Paris v. Paris, IO Ves. Jr.
185, 32 Eng. Rep. 815 (1804)] and not binding because the cases were decided
"after the Revolution."
60
Pennsylvania: Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857) (stock dividend). Iowa: Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215, IIO N.W. 599 (1907) (stock dividend). Minnesota:
Good)l'lin v. McGaughey, 108 Minn. 248, 122 N.W. 6 (1909) (stock dividend).
Mississippi: Simpson v. Millsaps, So Miss. 239, 31 So. 912 (1902) (stock dividend).
New Hampshire: Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 A. 124 (1907). New Jersey: Day v. Faulks, 79 N.J. Eq. 66, 81 A. 354 (19u) 81 N.J. Eq. 173, 88 A. 384
(1913) (cash dividend); Hagedorn v. Arens, 106 N.J. Eq. 377, 150 A. 5 (1931)
(stock dividend). Sout/i Carolina: Cobb v. Fant, 36 S. C. 1, 14 S.E. 959 (1891)
(liquidation). Tennessee: Pritchitt v. Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S.W.
1064 (1897) (stock dividend). Vermont: In re Heaton's Estate, 89 Vt. 550, 96 A.
21 (1916) (stock dividend). Wisconsin: Estate of Dittmer, 197 Wis. 304, 222 N.W.
323 (1929) (stock dividend); Will of Jenkins, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N.W. 733 (1929)
(stock dividend). Hawaii: Evans v. Garvie, 23 Hawaii 651 (1917) (stock dividend).
The Pennsylvania rule was formerly followed in California, Maryland and New .
York. Estate of Duffill, 180 Cal. 478, 183 P. 337 (1919) (stock dividend); Estate
of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 375, 197 P. 90 (1921) (cash dividend); Northern Central
Dividend Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 A. 338 (1915) (stock and cash dividends); Matter
of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723, 823 (1913) (s"tock dividend). The Massachusetts rule is now in force in California and Maryland by the enactment of the
Uniform Principal and Income Act. See note 129, infra. N. Y. Laws (1922),
c. 452, § 2, as amended by Laws (1926), c. 843, now N. Y. Personal Property Law,
§ I 7-a enacts the Massachusetts rule as to stock dividends, though as to extraordinary
cash dividends it is probable that New York will continue to follow the Pennsylvania
rule. See 2 ScoTr, Thusrs, § 236.3, p. 1302 (1939).
61
1928 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. CoMM. ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, in connection with the first draft of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, says at p. 210 "In
opposition to this [ the Massachusetts rule] is the Pennsylvania rule, or variations of it;
for there seems to be no definite opposing rule."
58

59
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tration. Assume the corporation is a department store which owns its
own land and buildings worth $ r ,000,000 at the date of the creation
of the instrument. Annually the corporation earns $rno,ooo. It sells
the land and building after fifteen years at $2,000,000, declares a one
hundred per cent cash dividend anp. buys a new·site for $ r ,000,000. It
is clear that the annual earnings of $ r 00,000 go to the life tenant.
Under the later Pennsylvania rule, the cash dividend goes to the remainderman because the corporate res had increased in value and this
res belonged to the remainderman. As far as legal relations go, the
facts are those of the Wisconsin case of Miller v. Payne 62 and the decision was for the res view of the Pennsylvania rule, 63 the opinion reading: 64 "Any dividend derived from a mere enhancement of the value
of assets representing capital from sources other than the accumulation of earnings belongs to the remainderman and not to the life
tenant. It represents corpus, not income." The Wisconsin court, however, recognized that if the corporation were engaged in buying and
selling real estate regularly profits on such sales would belong to the
life tenant.65 The equity of this rule has been already pointed out,06
but its practicality must now be considered. Where the res consists of
a few large parcels the rule is easy to apply. But what should be the
guide where there are many articles and frequent sales? Does the rule
150 Wis. 354,136 N.W. 8II (1912).
2 ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 236.6, p. 1308 (1939) says: "To the extent to which
the dividend is declared out of capital gains, even though those gains accrued during
the period of the trust, it is treated as principal. As to all this the courts which
hold that extraordinary dividends should be apportioned are agreed." This can well
be questioned for only in a few jurisdictions has the choice between the res and
quantum approach arisen and even in those jurisdictions one cannot speak confidently
of the result, a fortiori in states where the problem has not arisen.
64 150 Wis. 354 at 378.
65 The court said, 150 Wis. at 378-379: "To this rule there is a well-known
exception in the case of a corporation engaged in buying and selling real estate at a
profit, and if the St. Paul Avenue Improvement Company could be considered a trading
corporation in real estate within the meaning of the exception to the rule stated, the
profit accruing to the corporation, whether derived from an enhancement of value of
real estate, or from rents and profits in excess of cost and maintenance, would be considered income and belong to the life tenant."
66 See supra, note 37. But at least one case of an accidental result can be put
under the Pennsylvania rule. The settlor or creator of the interest may well have
desired to retain control of a corporation by maintaining a given proportion (not
necessarily a majority) of the shares. Stock dividends which are declared partially
income may well change this proportion. But it would seem here that the court
could .usually find evidence enough in and of the desire to retain control to hold
that the Pennsylvania rule was negatived by the testator's intent.
62
63
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that asset revaluation surplus goes to the remainderman apply only
where the res is more stable and a different rule apply where the res,
turns over in sales very frequently? It is submitted that two rules
should not be in force because ( r) that would make the benefit to the
remainderman hinge on whether he was fortunate enough to have an
interest in shares of stock in a corporation possessing a relatively stable
res or one possessing no stable res but involving an equal amount of
capital investment and ( 2) that would raise a new problem as to what
res may be classed as stable.67
•
Several other variants can be found modifying the Pennsylvania
rule as the facts demand to achieve a rough equity between the
parties. 68
The Pennsylvania rule is the more equitable because it attempts to
allocate the dividend on the basis of income and principal, whereas the
Massachusetts rule ( discussed in the next section) is based on simplicity
and any relation to income and principal is accidental. 69
It seems that only the matter of difficulty weighs against the Pennsylvania rule, as even the courts upholding the Massachusetts rule
admit. There are two possible difficulties: ( r) determining whether
a dividend is extraordinary or regular, and ( 2) if the former, determining what share goes to the life tenant and what to the remainderman. Among the circumstances which are important in determining
whether a dividend is ordinary or extraordinary are the following·: 10
( r) whether similar dividends have been declared regularly in the
past, ( 2) whether such dividends are regularly paid out of current
earnings, (3) the size of the dividend in relation to the market value
and the par value at the date of the creation of the interests, (4) the
designation of the dividend by the directors as ordinary or extra67

This problem is also considered infra at note l l 2 et seq.
Another example is the Rhode Island rule. In the earliest Rhode Island case,
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 42 R.I. 365, 107 A. 209 (1919), the
court rejected the Massachusetts rule as to cash dividends and applied the Pennsylvania
rule, holding that such dividends are income only to the extent they are declared out
of earnings during the period of the trust. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Tucker, 51 R.I. 507, 155 A. 661 (1931), the court followed the Massachusetts rule
in holding that stock dividends are capital. It appears that Rhode Island has a hybrid
rule.
The earlier New York law [before Laws, 1922, c. 452, § 2, and before Matter
of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723, 823, (1913), see note 60 supra] was in
a state of flux.
69
See supra, note 59.
70
l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236, comment C (1935).
68
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ordinary, and (5) the source of the earnings from which the distribution is made.
If the dividen9- is/ ordinary, it goes to the life tenant and the case
need go no further. If the dividend is extraordinary, the case proceeds to the division of the dividend. If the quantum view is taken,
the court will need only the corporate balance sheet of the accounting
date nearest to the creation of the interests and the balance sheet after
dividend to determine whether the quantum is still intact.
If the res theory is accepted 71 difficulty does arise. Here the problem centers about the question when the dividends were earned. When
a stock or cash dividend is declared, should it be considered as earned
before or after the creation of the interest or pro rata before and after?
Three views are possible. The view that the earnings were all made
prior to the trust's creation has never been taken. For a while some
courts held that the earnings should be prorated between principal and
income in the ratio which earnings before and after bore to the total
earnings. More recently the view has been taken that dividends should
be deemed earned after the creation of the interest to the extent that
1.t was possible to do so.
Perhaps the leading case on the point is Matter of Osborne.12 In
that case the court first held that an extraordinary stock dividend
should be divided in such proportion as the earnings since the trust's
creation bore to the total accrued earnings and this was to be considered
income and the balance principal. On a rehearing this was held erroneous and the method of apportionment was held to be to consider the
dividend declared- from the most recent earnings to the extent that
such was possible. But the court seemed to incline to the quantum approach by holding that so much of the divid,end as was necessary to
maintain the capital unimpaired belonged to the remainderman.
Another difficulty is raised by cumulative preferred shares as regards ordinary dividends which have been accumulating for a period.
Under the Pennsylvania rule there is a split. In Thompson v. New
York Trust Co.,13 a New York case, and in Grazer's Estate,74 a lower court Pennsylvania case, the ordinary dividend rule was followed and
71 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 236.6, p. 1398;(1939), quoted supra, note 63, assumes
that the res view is uniformly accepted and acceptable.
·
72 299 N. Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723, 823 (1913). The case antedates the 1917
statute providing that stock dividends should not be apportioned.
,
78 107 Misc. 245, 177 N.Y.S. 299 (1919), affd. 191 App. Div. 904, 181 N.Y.S.
956 (1920); and Matter of Palmer, 167 Misc. 624, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 833 (1938).
I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236, comment g (1935), ·concurs.
74 27 Pa. D. & C. 179 (1936).
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no apportionment allowed. In Maryland 75 an opposite result was
reached.
Under the Massachusetts rule this difficulty does not arise because
accrued cumulative dividends on preferred stock are a fortiori not apportionable when extraordinary dividends are not apportionable.76
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania rule is not too difficult of
application in view of its equity. The Restatement of Trusts, section
236, adopts it. However, the Commissioners on Uniform Laws
adopted the Massachusetts rule. 11

D.

The Massachusetts Rule

The next American decision after Earp's Appeal established the
Massachusetts rule. In Minot v. Paine 18 in r868 the Massachusetts
court adopted the rule that cash dividends go to the life tenant and
stock dividends to the remainderman. In that case, a bill for instructions was brought by the trustees to determine the distribution of a
stock dividend. The will was proved January 22, r866 (the date of
death does not appear). On June II, r866, the trustee bought stock
as an investment. There were dividends in November, r866, and May,
r867, at the rate of five per cent. Then on September r7, r867, the
trustee received another cash dividend of five per cent and a stock
dividend of twenty per cent declared August 2r, r867. The executor
also held shares in another corporation and in June, r867, received a
thirty per cent stock dividend. The court held immaterial the facts
that the stocks were bought in the first instance after the death and in
the second had passed at death to the executor. 79
The Massachusetts court takes a variant of the res theory. The
corporation has the right to determine (by its dividend policy) from
75

Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 174 Md. 639, 197 A. 292, 1 A. (2d) 83, 739
(1938).
76
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Adams, 219 Mass. 175, I06 N.E. 590
(1919) (cash dividend); Coolidge v. Grant, 251 Mass. 352, 146 N. E. 718 (1929)
(cash and stock dividend).
77
See infra, section IV, G of this paper.
78 99 Mass. IOI (1868).
79
Under the Pennsylvania rule this might be supported on the theory that the
purchase price (which was capital) was paid for the rough book value (which thereby
became capital) and that any earnings before the date of purchase were therefore capital.
Of course with the rule of thumb Massachusetts principle there would be no problem,
only the form of the dividend being material, and so the court in Minot v. Paine, 99
Mass. 101 at I06, said: "The court do not regard the fact that the dividends were
made from the net earnings of the road as material."
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time to time what the corporate res shall be. 80 The court then advances
its own rule based on convenience: 81 "A simple rule is, to regard cash
dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however
made, as capital." 82 Then the court turned to the case law. The English cases were examined in detail and found unsatisfactory ( the court
noting Lord Eldon's dissatisfaction with the English -rule 83 ) in theory
and practice, just as the Pennsylvania court had rejected the English
rule as "unreasonable and absurd." The Massachusetts court distinguished the Pennsylvania rule of Earp's Appeal by merely saying,84
"But in that case the fact that the corporation has, within the limits of
its charter, the power to withhold dividends, and use all its funds in
such a way as merely to increase its property, is not discussed." If this
were true it would still be an inadequate distinction. But the Massacusetts court misstated the case. The Pennsylvania court did discuss
exactly that point, pointing out 85 that it is exactly because such ac80
The court said, Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI at 107 (1868): "So, if they
[ the directors] had thus invested it [ the net receipts], and, instead of increasing the
- number of shares, had increased their par value, the shares would have been mere
capital, and not income, as to the shareholders, though increased in value by the
application of the net income of the road to that purpose. So, when the'y increase
the number of shares, each share of all the stock in the corporation is in its nature
capital."
Of course if there is an allegation mala fides by the directors in an effort to harm
either life tenant or remainderman, the decision of the directors will not be binding
upon their demonstration of the fact of mala fides to the court.
81
99 Mass. IOI at I?8 (1868).
82 This rule was consistent with two earlier Massachusetts decisions, the first
[Reed v. Head, 6 Allen (88 Mass.) 174 (1863)] allotting cash divide~ds to the life
tenant and the second [Atkins v. Albree, 12 Allen (94 Mass.) 359 (1866)] allotting
the right to subscribe to new shares to the remainderman. Neither of these cases
required the adoption of the Massachusetts rule to preserve consistency, however. In
the first case, the dividend funds arose from the sale of land and this was the only
source of dividends for the life tenant if he was to get any. In the second case, the
rule as to subscription to shares may well be different from the rule as to distribution
of dividends.
83
See supra. note 46.
s.i Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI at I II ( I 868).
85
28 Pa. 368 at 375 (1857): "But where the profits of a manufacturing or
banking corporation have been accumulating for many years, until the market value
of the stock is more than double its original price and the owner dies, directing the
'income' of his estate to be applied to particular objects for limited periods, these
extraordinary accumulations are as much a part of his capital as any other portion of
his estate, and must, therefore, be regarded as forming a part of the principal from
which the future income is to arise. In this case the sum accumulated is entirely too
large to be disposed of on the principle of judicial convenience, applicable only to
ordinary and current dividends and payments."
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cumulation can take place that a rule of convenience is to be avoided.
Any rule of law which is arbitrary and accidental will sooner or
later come upon a case where it will work obvious inequity. The fact
that the cash-stock dividend basis of division is arbitrary is not hard
to see. Corporations seldom determine whether to issue dividends in
the form of cash or stock because of the fact that the dividends were
or were not earned before or after a given date. Many other motives
are more probable.
Massachusetts did not have long to wait before the case testing the
arbitrary nature of the rule came. The very next year, in I 869, Leland
v. Hayden 86 raised the problem. In that case a railroad had acquired
some of its own shares with its accumulated earnings. Then it offered
its stockholders the right to subscribe for new stock and if they did not,
it was to be sold publicly and it ordered a dividend of forty per cent
paid one-half in cash to be derived from the sale of the new shares and
one-half in stock from the shares it had just acquired. The court held
that 87 "In substance, as well as in intent, it was a cash dividend,
though it was not such in form; and the substance and intent must
govern the transaction." The Massachusetts court had undermined its
own logic of convenience and now found itself searching around in the
records and proceedings of the corporation as much as if it were using
the Pennsylvania rule, which admittedly achieves greater equity. 88
80

102 Mass. 542 (1869).
Id. at 5 5 I. The reasoning of the court was: "The purchase shares represented
cash invested so as to earn an income. If the directors had sold them and divided
the avails, there could have been no doubt that it was a cash dividend. Or if the
investment had been in the stocks of other corporations and the stocks divided, it
would have been the same. As it was, the dividend did not affect the value of the
shares upon which it was made, relatively to the whole capital stock of the company.
The shares originally held by the trustees constituted the same fractional part of the
whole capital stock after the dividend, as before."
88
Perhaps the Massachusetts court might not have accepted this position had it
not been for a preceding case, Daland v. Williams, IOI Mass. 571 (1869). In that
case a bill of instructions was brought by trustees to ascertain the division of a dividend.
Because under the laws of Maine the corporation could not pay a stock dividend and
because it wanted to retain the capital (and therefore would not declare a cash dividend) although it was willing to "distribute" the surplus, the corporation resorted to
a device. The directors voted to increase the capital stock by issuing 3,000 shares at
$100 a share and declare a dividend of 40% payable in cash but authorized the treasurer to receive the dividend in payment of 2,800 of the shares and to sell the remaining shares. There were in all 7,000 shares entitled to the dividend, which were
at an advance of I 30% in the market before the dividend. In form the dividend
was in cash, but actually no shareholder would take it in cash. Even if a shareholder
wanted the money he would first take the stock and sell it on the market at the going
price of $65 for the stock which the $40 dividend could be exchanged for. The
court directed that the trustee must take the shares and that they belonged to capital,
87
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It is submitted that the Massachusetts rule.is now as inconvenient
to the court as the Pennsylvania rule because the court must investigate
corporate matters and cannot rely on a rule of thumb. Further, trustees
do not have "the plain principle" which the court in Minot v. Paine 89
thought it was creating. The Massachusetts rule has been fruitful of
other litigation on this point.90
The Massachusetts rule is followed in twenty-two states and probably the federal courts,91 but of these states, thirteen are by statute,
with Rhoq.e Island and New York having a hybrid rule.92
- The federal rule has an interesting history. In the early case of
Gibbons v. Mahon,98 the United States Supreme Court decided to
though in form it was a, cash dividend. The court said, 101 Mass. at 574: "No
prudent trustee would doubt that he ought to elect to take the shares, having a market
value of $163 [i.e., in the ratio of $65 to $40 ], rather than the dividend in cash;
and, indeed, the defendants ask for a decree to that effect. They pray that the
trustees may be directed not merely to take the money, but to pay it directly back to
the treasurer and receive new shares therefor, thereby obtaining a stock dividend.
But, if the trustees receive _it as a cash dividend, they are to credit it and account for
it as such. The stock would then remain in the hands of the company, and the
remaindermen might receive their proportion of its value. This is not what the
plaintiffs desire. They ask, in substance, that the trustees shall pay it to the tenants
for life as income. We think it is clearly their duty to take the stock; but, being a
stock dividend, they should treat it as capital." With this case on the books, it was
but a step to reach the result in Leland v. Hayden.
89 99 .Mass. IOI at 108 (1868): "A trustee needs some plain principle to guide
him, and the cestuis que trust ought not to be subjected to the expense of going behind
the action of the directors, and investigating the concerns of the corporation •••."
90 E.g., Rand v. Hubbell, II5 Mass. 461 (1874); Gifford v. Thompson, II5
Mass. 478 (1874).
91 Maine: Thatcher v. Thatcher, II7 Me. 331, 104 A. 515 (1918) {stock
dividend). Massachusetts: Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI (1868) (stock dividend).
Michigan: In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 226 N.W. 878 (1929) (stock and
cash dividends). Missouri: Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298
S.W. 91(1927). Nebraska: United States Trust Co. v. Cowin, 121 Neb. 427, 37
N.W. 284 (1931) (stock dividend). Ohio: Lamb v. Lehmann, uo Ohio St. 59, 143
N.E. 276 (1924) (stock dividend). West Virginia: Security Trust Co. v. Rammelsburg, 82 W. Va. 701, 97 S.E. 122 (1918) (stock dividend). As to New York and
. Rhode Island, see notes 60 and 68, supra.
By adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the Massachusetts rule
is in force in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia. See citations in note 129,
infra. Ga. Code Ann. ( I 93 7), § 8 5-60 5, is to. the same effect. Connecticut, Illinois,
North Carolina, and Virginia followed the Massachusetts rule even prior to adoption of
their statutes. Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 60 A. II]· (1905) (cash di'lidend);
De Koven v. Alsop, 205 Ill. 309, 68 N. E. 930 (1903) (stock and cash dividends);
Eastman v. State Bank, 259 Ill. App. 607 (1931) (regular stock dividend); Humph. rey v. Lang, 169 N. C. 601, 86 S. E. 526 (1915) (cash dividend); Kaufman v. Charlottesville Woolen Mills, 93 Va. 673, 25 S.E. 1003 (1896) (stock dividend).
92 See notes 60 and 68, supra.
98 136 u. s. 549, IO s. Ct._ 1057 (1889).
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adopt the Massachusetts rule in a case involving a stock dividend. The
court made no distinction between the English and Massachusetts
rules. The Massachusetts rule was adopted because it represented the
then weight of authority. 94
In a later tax case,95 Eisner v. Macomber, 96 Justice Brandeis in a
dissenting opinion throws out a pregnant dictum that perhaps, in the
light of the strong trend to the Pennsylvania rule, the federal courts
might well abandon the Massachusetts rule.97 However, since then the
pendulum has swung back so that now the states, aside from statute,
are evenly divided, such states as Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio
and Rhode Island recently taking the Massachusetts view. In 1923
in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 98 the Massachusetts rule was followed and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
E. The Kentucky Rule
'

The Kentucky rule. that all dividends paid during the life tenancy
go to the life tenant was established in Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Executor.99 The basis of the Kentucky rule seems to be that since the life
tenants are generally the wife and children of the testator, he probably
intended them to receive all dividends.100 There may formerly have
been some doubt as to whether the Kentucky rule gave all dividends
94 The Massachusetts rule was then followed in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Maine, and the Pennsylvania rule in New Hampshire and New Jersey, with New
York doubtful but leaning to the Massachusetts rule.
95 A decision that an increase of the res is income for tax purposes does not
establish that the increase is income between life tenant and remainderman. Holcombe
v. Ginn, 296 Mass. 415, 6 N.E. (2d) 351 (1937).
96 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct: 189 (1919).
97 Id. 252 U.S. at 235-236: "Whether, in view of these facts and the practical
results of the operation of the two rules as shown by the experience of the thirty
years which have elapsed since the decision in Gibbons v. Mahon, it might be desirable for this court to reconsider the question there decided, as some other courts have
done [ citing 29 HARV. L. REv. 551 ( l 9 l 6)] we have no occasion to consider in
this case."
98 Lanston v. Lanston, 53 App. D. C. 340, 290 F. 315 (1923), cert. den. 263
U.S. 703, 44 S. Ct. 33 (1923).
.
99 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892).
100 Id., 93 Ky at 266-267: "It cannot in reason be considered that the testator
contemplated such a result [ as the Massachusetts rule achieves]. The law regards
substance, and not form, and such a rule might result not only in a violation of the
testator's intention, but it would give the power to the corporation to beggar the
life tenants who, in this case, are the wife and children of the testator, for the benefit
of the remaindermen, who may perhaps be unknown to the testator, being unborn
when the will wa..~ executed. We are unwilling to adopt a rule which, to us, seems
so arbitrary and devoid of reason and justice."
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to the life tenants, but it was definitely so held in Lightfoot v. Beard.101
Delaware apparently follows Kentucky.102

F.

The Restatement of Trusts

The Restatement of Trusts 103 adopts the Pennsylvania rule. The
trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with the life tenant and
remainderman 104 and cannot buy or sell shares with the intent to unduly benefit one or the other because of impending extraordinary
dividends. If such purchases or sales are made, the court will make
such allocation as would have been made if the trustee had followed
his duty.105
The tests for whether a dividend is ordinary or extraordinary have
already been indicated.106 When the recipients of the dividend are
designated by directors as of a certain date, the holder of the interest
on that date gains the dividend ( consistent with the Pennsylvania
rule). If no date is specified, the date of declaration of the dividend is
taken. 101 Where stock is sold or acquired at a higher price because
dividends have been accumulating which the corporation has not
declared, there is no apportionment. 108
The matter of selecting between the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts rules gave rise to spirited debate before the American Law In230 Ky. 488, 20 S. W. (2d) 90 (1929).
Bryan v. Aiken, IO Del. Ch. 446, 86 A. 674 (1913), but if the stock represents "capital," which the Delaware court interprets to mean additions to the corpus
not gained through net earnings, then the stock goes to the remainderman. Cf.
DuPont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 A. 149 (1927); Ortiz v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 18 Del. Ch. 439, 159 A. 376 (1931).
103 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236 (1935): "Except as otherwise provided by the
terms of the trust, if shares of stock of a corporation are held in trust to pay the income
to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter to pay the principal to another
beneficiary .••
"(b) extraordinary dividends declared during the period, whether in cash or in
shares of the corporation or in other property, are income to the extent and
only to the extent that they are declared out of the earnings of the corporation which accrued subsequent to the creation of the trust or the acquisition
of the shares by the trustee."
104 The life tenant-remainderman situation is, used to avoid the more artificial
language of possessory and future owner and because the life tenant situation is most
common. The rule however applies to all future interests.
105 l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 183 (1935).
106 See supra, discussion after note 70; 1 TRUSTS RES!ATEMENT, § 236, com- _
ment c (1935).
107 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236, comment i (1935). The rule is the same
in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania jurisdictions. E.g., Ward v. Blake, 247 Mass. 430,
142 N.E. 52 (1924) and In re Knox's Estate, 328 Pa. 177, 195 A. 28 (1<}37).
lOS l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236, comment g (1935).
101
102
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stitute in the discussion of the tentative draft.100 Perhaps the fact that
the Uniform Principal and Income Act _favors the Massachusetts rule
gave rise to an effort to incorporate this rule. At any rate, Judge Gest
of the Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania, which initially handles the
accounts of executors, trustees and other fiduciaries in Pennsylvania,
sent a letter to the Institute: "However abstractly correct the Pennsylvania rule. may be in theory, it is not practical as a general rule ...
and I think I may say that, as a Court, we favor the Massachusetts
rule, and some of us very emphatically." 110 On the other hand, Justice
Kephart of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania staunchly defended the
Pennsylvania rule.
Professor Powell 111 raised several objections to the Pennsylvania
rule. First, the corporation very often is a foreign corporation and an
auditor has to be sent to examine the books and considerable expense
is incurred by the trustee in getting the facts as to the value of the
shares at the date of the creation of the trust. This suggests an important factor which could be readily eliminated. Today corporations must
make at least annual statements for tax purposes and more often
monthly, weekly or even daily statements are drawn up in the regular
course of business. If the rule were adopted that the value taken is to
be that of the nearest accounting date, much of the difficulty and most
of the expense would no longer be necessary.
A second and more fundamental objection was that book values of
a statement drawn up to serve other purposes may well not be useful
as a basis for division between life tenant and remainderman. This
strikes at the problem of valuation, a problem which is not peculiar to
income and principal division but is met in taxation and many other
branches of the law. Intangibles such as copyrights or patents may be
carried on the books at arbitrary and nominal figures. Or as happened
in Bourne v. Bourne 112 there was a trust created in 1918 with shares in
Singer Sewing Machine Company which had large investments in Russia. About a year previous to that the Russian Revolution had taken
place. But not until 1919 •did the directors decide to charge off the
Russian investments which amounted to $20,000,000. This gave the
remainderman an artifically high valuation. Singer continued to make
money and accumulated a surplus from which it declared a stock
dividend. The court held that the life tenant got no extraordinary
100

I I AM. L. INST. PROC. l 84-20 5 ( l 93 3).
Id. 187-188.
111
Id. 191 ff.
112
240 N.Y. 172, 148 N.E. 180 (1925).
110
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dividend shares, even though the earnings accrued during the life
tenancy, until the earnings made up the $20,000,000 deficit. To this
difficulty there are two solutions. First, the value given by the corporation is only a prima facie value. This problem had arisen in Pennsyl-.
vania and the court held 118 that "intact _value" was the figure to be
taken and that "prima facie, intact value is book value." The other
. solution is not to accept a valuation at the creation of the trust but to
look to the res and to attempt to follow the res through the period of
the life tenaricy. This, however, is impracticable and too complicated
if strictly applied.114 The Pennsylvania court has worked out part of
this concept. Intact value does not mean a quantum. "It is so named
because that value is to be kept intact for remaindermen." 115
The res approach has resulted in the court's admitting certain
fluctuations in the value of the corporate res where such changes can
be more readily followed. In its latest statement this means that: 116
"Intact value may be increased by stock purchases, contributed surplus
or any other capital increase not attributable to earnings,117 and it is
subject to capital losses." 118
· In Dickinson's Estate 119 the stock was in a fire insurance company.
At the creation of the trust the shares were worth $142.61.120 Losses
incurred by the San Francisco fire wiped out the earnings accrued from
the date of the creation of the trust and ate into the value of the stock
at the creation of the trust. The value being $71.09 after the fire, it
was held that the risk of this loss was on the remainderman.121 But
how, logically, can the court distinguish between the loss due to the
San Francisco fire and that due to the burning of a slum hovel? How
113 First stated in Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39 at 42, 148 A. 907 (1930).
Confirmed in: Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422 at 427, 162 A. 295 (1932). Followed
in New York in Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450 at 485, 103 N.E. 723, 823
(1913), where the court said: "The intrinsic value of the trust investment is to be
ascertained•••• Market value, good will and like considerations cannot be considered
in apportioning a dividend."
114 See supra, discussion beginning at note 66.
115 Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422 at 427, 162 A. 295 (1932).
116 Id., 308 Pa. at 427-428.
117 Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449 at 453, 132 A. 352 (1926); 'Packer's Estate
(no. 1), 291 Pa. 194, 139 A. 867 (1937); Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa.
149, 140 A. 862 (1928).
.
118 Dickinson's.Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 A. 352 (1926); Packer's Estate (no. 1),
291 Pa. 194, 139 A. 867 (1937).
119 Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 A. 352 (1926).
120 Throughout the period the market value of the stock was from $250 to $400
(buyers arriving at that figure on a capitalized earnings' basis) but the court speaks of
"liquidation value" throughout.
121 Cf. Willcox's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. 182 (1917).
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draw the line between a "big" loss and a "little" loss? In the same case
there still remained some surplus even after the fire because par was
$50. Additional stock was sold above par and the difference credited
to a "contributed surplus" account which the court held accrued to the
remainderman as a capital gain.122 This made the stock in terms of
intact value worth $183.59, i.e., dividing the· surplus among the original members yielded $183.59. But dividing the surplus among the
original and the new members gave a book value of $152.16. A stock
dividend of one hundred per cent had been declared. The court directed that so much of that dividend be given to the remainderman as
would raise his holdings to the average of $183.69 for the original
shares. In this case that meant about twenty per cent of the dividend.
In a dissenting opinion Justice Kephart argued that the loss of the San
Francisco fire was like any other loss and ought to be charged to profit
and loss and not to capital. Under this view thirty-seven per cent of
the dividend would go to the remainderman.
Both views assume that the "contributed surplus" goes to the
remainderman as a capital gain. This in itself denies the quantum view.
It would seem that Pennsylvania now accepts a modified res approach,
shifting from the apparent quantum approach in Earp's Appeal.128
The Restatement of Trusts gives no hint whether the quantum or
res approach to the Pennsylvania rule should be taken. Of the eleven
jurisdictions following the Pennsylvania rule, most have not had to
decide between a quantum or res approach and, except in Pennsylvania
and possibly Wisconsin,1 24 the law cannot be said to be one way or the
other although most of the language points to a quantum approach.125
The presumption is, in Pennsylvania, that the extraordinary dividend is from earnings and belongs to the life tenant.126
The American Law Institute voted 121 against the Massachusetts
rule 47 to 35. The matter was scheduled to come before the group
when the final draft was presented but it was not raised at that time.128
122

Cf. Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 A. 1108 (1901).
See supra, the discussion following note 56.
124
See supra, at note 62.
125
This is probably due to the fact that a value is usually assessed as of the date
of the creation of the trust, even though the res approach is taken, and the courts
thereafter speak of that value as a quantum.
126
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 154 A.
814 (1931); Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 A. 1108 (1901); McKeown's
Estate, 263 Pa. 78, I06 A. 189 (1919).
127
II AM. L. INST. PROC. 204 (1933).
128
Nothing appears in the final action on the Trusts Restatement, 12 AM. L.
INST. PROC. 93-149 (1935).
128
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G. Uniform Principal and Income Act
The Uniform Principal and Income Act,120 adopts the Massachusetts rule.130 Nothing can be added to what has already been said
except that the Uniform Act does well in anticipating the situation
where the trustee has a choice between cash and stock dividends. The
Uniform Act holds that whatever the trustee's choice it shall be
deemed a cash dividend. The Uniform Act had four tentative drafts,131
but from the beginning it .adopted the Massachusetts rule.
V
DIVISION OF OTHER BENEFITS FROM CORPORATE STOCK

A. Rights to Subscribe
I. Majority rule: Rights to Subscribe Go to Remainderman
On occasions, corporations give ( and in some cases the right is
pre-emptive by charter, by-laws or otherwise) present shareholders
precedence in subscribing to new issues. This right may be valuable
for many reasons, e.g., the new shares may be offered by the corporation at less than the prevailing market price, or the new shares may
be important in acquiring or maintaining control of the corporation.
To whom will such rights accrue, life tenant or remainderman? Under
129 The Uniform Act was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in
September, 1931. 1931 HANDBOOK 120. It has since been enacted in the following:
Ala. Laws (1939), p. 902, Code (1940), tit. 58, §§75-87; Cal. Laws (1941), p.
2476, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1941 Supp.), Act 8696; Conn. Laws (1939), c. 254a,
Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1939), §§ 1292e-1301e; Fla. Laws (1937), c. 18392, Comp. Gen.
Laws (Supp. 1940), §§5671 (2)-5671 (15); Ill. Laws (1941), p. 407, Stat. Ann.
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1942), c. 30, §§ 159-176; La. Laws (1938), No. 81, Gen. Stat.
(Dart, 1939), §§ 9850.68-9850.78; Md. Laws (1939), c. 580, Code Ann. (Flack,
1939), art. 79B; N. C. Laws (1937), c. i90, Code (Supp. 1937), §§ 4035 (1) to
4035 (15), Okla. Laws (1941), p. 250, Stat. Ann. (1941), tit. 60, §§ 175.26175.36; Ore. Laws (1931), c. 371, Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), §§ 74-101 to 74-114,
Utah Laws (1939), c. 127; Va. Laws (1936), c. 432, Code (1942), §§ 5133c-5133r.
130 Uniform Principal and Income Act, §5: "Corporate Dividends and Share
Rights. (I) All dividends on shares of a corporation forming a part of the principal
which are payable in the shares of the corporation shall be deemed prfocipal. Subject
to the provisions of this section, all dividends payable otherwise than in the shares of
the corporation itself, including ordinary and extraordinary dividends and dividends
payable in shares or other securities or obligations of corporations other than the
declaring corporation, shall be deemed income. Where the trustee shall have the
option of receiving a dividend either in cash or in the shares of the declaring corporation, it shall be considered as a cash dividend and deemed income, irrespective of the
choice made by the trustee."
.
131 1928 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. oF CoMMRS. UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 206-217;
1929 id. 285-297; 1930 id. 341-35,2; 1931 id. 326-337.
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the Massachusetts rule it is natural enough that such rights should
follow the course of stock and therefore go to the remainderman.132
But also under the majority of states following the Pennsylvania rule,
the rights accrue133 to the remainderman. The logic of this approach
will be discussed presently.

Minority rule: Rights to Subscribe Are Apportionable
In Pennsylvania itself, however, and likewise in New Hampshire134 the rights are apportioned. Under early cases Pennsylvania and
New Hampshire had held otherwise.135 In favor of giving the rights
to the remainderman are two arguments. One reason for not apportioning ordinary dividends is that the amounts involved are small.
The same applies to the right to subscribe, as a rule. The second
argument is that proper apportionment of rights to subscribe is more
difficult than apportionment of stock dividends.
The first step taken by the Pennsylvania court was to treat proceeds
from the sale of subscription rights as apportionable,136 so much to the
remainderman as was necessary to preserve his "intact value," the
remainder to the life tenant. But the first case to involve the exer_cise
of rights to subscribe from the funds of the trust itself was In re Hostetter's Trust. 181 The court had two choices: ( r) to award the remainderman enough of the new shares subscribed to compensate for the
cash removed from the fund and after that to apportion the balance
2.

132 Davis v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58, 25 N.E. 21 (1890); DeKoven v. Alsop, 205
Ill. 309, 68 N.E. 930 (1903); Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 208
Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324 (1935).
133 But cf. Matter of Kernochan, 104 N. Y. 618, II N. E. 149 (1887). The
rule today in New York will p~esumably be otherwise as a result of the New York
statute providing that stock dividends go to the remainderman. See supra, note 60.
There have been two cases since the act. In Matter of Hagen, 262 N. Y. 301, 186
N .E. 792 ( 193 3), the trust was set up in I 917 and the statute would not apply. In
Matter of Hamersley, 152 Misc. 903, 274 N.Y.S. 303 (1934), the date of the trust
does not appear. In both cases, the remainderman received the rights. Ballantine v.
Young, 79 N.J. Eq. 70, 81 A. 119 (1911); Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275, 135
N. W. 14 (1921); Girdwood v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 143 Md. 245, 122 A.
132 (1923); Estate of Merrill, 196 Wis. 351, 220 N.W. 215 (1928), overruling
In re Will of Barron, 163 Wis. 275, 155 N. W. 1087 (1916).
134 In re Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 A. 567 (1935); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 A. 124 (1907). Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, California law was the same: In re Schnur's Estate, (Cal. 1934)
32 P. (2d) 970.
135 Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877), down to Veech's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 373
(1920); Walker v. Walker, 68 N. H. 407, 39 A. 432 (1895).
136 Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 A. 200 (1927).
137 319 Pa. 572, 181 A. 567 (1935).
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to the remainderman until the intact value of the original fund was
achieved, leaving the final residue to the life tenant, or ( 2) to award
the remainderman enough shares to bring the fund up to its original
intact value with the balance to the life tenant. The second method
was adopted in line with a dictum ~n a previous case.138 It is submitted
that the court was right.139 The choice clearly hinges on whether the
res or quantum view is to be adopted. The Pennsylvania court initially
adopted the quantum view140 and concurrence in the quantum approach
138 Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 A. 862 (1928). On the
figures of the Hostetter case, two different results would be reached. Under the
first solution the result would be:

To remainderman:
Original I 300 shares now at $91.65, originally at $78.60
Replacement of cash by new shares, l 88 shares at $91.65

$119,145
17,230

To life tenant:
The balance, 157 shares at $91.65
Under the.second system, intact value would be made up of:
Original 1300 shares at $78.60
Shares purchased, 345 at $50.00
Intact value

$102,180
17,250
$I 19,430

Hence remainderman gets 1304 shares at $91.65
and life tenant gets balance 341 at same price

$150,764
189 A note in 84 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 796 at 797, (1935) finds the decision wrong,
however.
140 The note in 84 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 796 (1935), adopts the res view and has
another practical leg to stand on, arguing that the increase in value of original shares
"represents accumulated surplus which has not been realized, either through declaration of a dividend or sale by the trustee, and, therefore, belongs to the remainderman.
Had the trustee sold the rights, or given them to the life tenant, the distribution suggested above [i. e., result I above] would have resulted and to permit the substantially similar transaction in this case to affect the distribution seems inequitable." The
last part of the analysis is logical, but would the result in the case of a sale be the
same as suggested in result I? In Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 A. 295
( 193 2), the court still maintains a tendency to the res view begun in Vinton's Appeal,
99 Pa. 434 (1882). This would lend support to the note writer's point of view. But
this decision in itself is evidence that Pennsylvania h~ not adopted either theory and
that a more accurate definition will be necessary, like the definition of intact value
which has evolved from market value [Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857)] to book
value [Stoke's Estate No. 1, 240 Pa. 277, 87 A. 971 (1913)] to presumptive book
value [Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 A. 352 (1926) ].
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is the motive for agreement here ( assuming apportionment is to be
made). 141

3. Restatement of Trusts and Uniform Principal and Income Act
Since only two states 142 hold that there is apportionment of rights
to subscribe and the great majority give such rights to the remainderman, it is quite natural that the Restatement of Trusts148 and the
Uniform Principal and Income Act144 concur with the majority as to
rights to subscribe to shares145 of the corporation. But as to rights to
subscribe to shares of a corporation other than of that whose shares are
held in trust, the Restatement holds that such shares likewise belong
to principal but the Uniform Act provides they go to income. The'
first draft of the Uniform Act1 46 provided as the Restatement does, but
the second draft changed to the final form. 147 Although there is a split
in the case law following the lines of the split on subscription rights
in the shares of a corporation whose shares are not held by the trust,148
once having accepted the majority rule as to rights of subscription in
the corporation whose shares are held by the trust, it would seem that
there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to rights to
subscribe to shares in a corporation other than of that whose shares are
held by the trust.
The Restatement1 '19 negatives any distinction between the case
where rights to subscribe are exercised and that where they are sold.
B. Voting Rights
Voting rights do not raise the same problems of apportionment.
If there is a trust for life tenant and remainderman, the trustee votes
141 The quantum approach in matters of right to subscribe does not necessarily
mean holding that approach in the division of stock and cash dividends ( witness the
difference of most states following the Pennsylvania rule as to stock and cash dividends
but holding the remainderman entitled to rights to subscribe). The reason for concurring with the Pennsylvania court is that such a result achieves a greater unity of
apportionment rules by emphasizing "intact value."
142 See supra, note 134.
148 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§ 236 (c) (1935).
144 Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 5(2).
145 As used here, the term shares includes all securities.
.
146 1928 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF. CoMMRS. UNIFORM STATE LAWS 209.
147 1929 id. 289.
148 Apportioning such rights is Eisner'~ Estate, 175 Pa. 143, 34 A. 577 (1896),
but Matter of Martin, 138 Misc. 216, 245 N.Y.S. 201 (1930) affd. 233 App. Div.
33, 251 N. Y.S. 587 (1931), finds them principal.
149 I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 236, comment w (1935).
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the shares.150 If the interests are legal, it would seem each interest
would vote during its term. Professor Simes151 argues, plausibly, that
since matters may arise which would require a long-range view, the
life tenant may be under a quasi-fiduciary duty to the remainderman
to refrain from voting adversely to the remainderman's interests. No
cases have been found, but in North Carolina by statute each party,
in the case of legal interests, votes during his term.152

C. Liquidation Dividends and Proceeds from Sales
Upon the theory that there is nq income on corporation stock until
a dividend has been declared by the directors, states following the
Massachusetts rule allocate the entire liquidating dividend to principal
even where it includes accumulated earnings, simply because the
earnings have not been declared.153
In this respect the Massachusetts view is consistent with the view
on the allocation of the proceeds from sales of stock, which also go
entirely to principal on the theory that there is merely a change of
corpus and it is immaterial whether cash or shares in a new corporation
are given out.154
This logic carries over to cases where there is only partial liquidation, the view again being that there is only a change in the form of
the corpus.155
Under the Pennsylvania rule it seems a distinction is taken between
a true liquidation, where there will be apportionment,156 and a merger
or consolidation,157 where there will be no apportionment. The ratio
150
Market St. Ry. v. Hellmann, 109 Cal. 571, 42 P. 225 (1895); Matter of
Ebbet's Will, 139 Misc. 250, 248 N.Y.S. 179 (1931); Commonwealth v. Dalzell,
152 Pa. 217, 25 A. 535 (1893); Hoppin v. Buffum, 9 R.I. 513 (1870). l T.ttusTS
RESTATEMENT, § 193 (1935) concurs, but the Uniform Principal and Income Act
is silent.
151
3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 698 (1936).
152
N. C. Code ( 193 I), § II 74. Aliter where the interests are equitable. Haywood v. Wright, 152 N.C. 421, 67 S.E. 982 (1910).
153
Gifford v. Thompson, II5 Mass. 478 (1874).
154
Curtis v. Osborn, 79 Conn. 555, 65 A. 968 (1907); Brownell v. Anthony,
189 Mass. 442, 75 N.E. 746 (1905); Wheeler v. Perry, 18 N.H. 307 (1846).
.
165
Second Universalist Church of Stamford v. ·Colegrove, 74 Conn. 79, 49 A.
902 (1901); Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E.
324 (1935); Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. ·432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930).
156
McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 106 A. 189 (1919); Spedden v. Norton, 159
Md. 101, 150 A. 15 (1930).
.
157
Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 A. 606 (1929); Matter of United States
Trust Co., 190 App. Div. 494, 180 N.Y.S. 12 (1920), affd. mem. 229 N.Y. 598,
129 N.E. 923 (1920); Estate of Gerlach, 177 Wis. 251, 1?8 N.W. 94 (1922); Cf.
DuPont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 A. 149 (1927).
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of division of the liquidation dividend is established by the ratio of
the intact value to the present presumptive book value.158
· Peculiarly enough, under the majority following the Pennsylvania
rule there is no apportionment of the proceeds of a sale of stocks held
in trust even though the proceeds are greater because of accrued earnings.159 But Pennsylvania is otherwise and apportions160 on the same
basis as was just presented for liquidation. In Pennsylvania it is also
held161 that where the trust shares are in a corporation which transfers
all its property to a new corporation for shares in the latter and these
new shares are distributed, there is a sale.162
As usual, the Restatement view is more "uniform" than that in
the Uniform Act. The Restatement of Trusts, section 236 ( d) provides for apportionment in case of liquidation. In section 233, comment b, the proceeds of a sale168 are held to be principal.
On the other hand, the Uniform Principal and Income Act, section
5 (3), provides that in case of liquidation, except for accrued dividends,
the whole is principal. The Uniform Act, section 5 ( 4), distinguishes
merger, consolidation and reorganization and provides that in that case
"the two corporations [ the old and the new] shall be considered a
single corporation in applying the provisions of this section." Presumably this means that the Massachusetts "form" rule stated in section 5 (I) should apply.
Under section 3 ( 2) of the Uniform Act, sale proceeds are treated
as principal. "Any profit or loss resulting upon any change in form
or principal shall enure to or fall upon principal." But if the sales are
of stock and occur in a business, a different rule governs, viz., such
profits and losses are income.164
158 And this throws the whole problem back into the consideration above of distribution of extraordinary dividends.
159 Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215, I IO N.W. 599 (1907); Guthrie's Trustee v.
Akers, 157 Ky. 649,163 S.W. 1117 (1914); Smith v. Hooper, 95 Md. 16, 51 A. 844,
54 A. 95 (1902); Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91
(1927); Berger v. Burnett, 97 N.J. Eq. 169, 127 A. 160 (1924); Matter of Kernochan, 104 N.Y. 618, 11 N.E. 149 (1887); Bothwell v. Estep, 166 Wash. 420, 6 P. (2d)
1108 (1932); Estate of Gerlach, 177 Wis. 251, 188 N.W. 94 (1922).
160 Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 A. 200 (1927).
161 ln re Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 A. 754 (1936).
162 But distinguish this from Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 A. 606 (1929),
which was held neither sale nor liquidation, but consolidation.
168 Except in the case of unproductive or wasting property.
164 Cf. supra, section on division of business receipts. I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,
§ 233, comment b (1935), concurs.
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VI
BoND PREMIUM AND DiscouNT AMoRTIZATION 165

A. The Case Law
The case law on bond premium and discount amortization is quite
uniform. The basic distinction as to premiums is whether the bonds
were part of the principal at the time of the creation of the future
interests or whether the bonds were purchased at a later date. In the
event that the bonds are at a premium and were part of the principal
at the date of the creation of the interests, the trustee need not amortize what must be an annual loss if the bonds are held until maturity
since at maturity they will be worth only par.166 The decision in such
cases can usually be bolstered by some language in the instrument that
the full amount of interest is to go to the life tenant. Ordinarily the
amount involved in such premiums is not large and if the bonds are
proper trust investments, it would seem that their retention was in
accord with the testator's presumed desires. The case of legal interests
is even stronger.. If the creator of the interests saw fit to leave such
a res, there is ordinarily no authority to change the res ( as there may
be a duty on the trustee to do) and this establishes a clearer case for
giving the entire interest payment to the life tenant.
The rule is otherwise, however, with respect to premiums on bonds
purchased by a 'trustee. In that case amortization must take place to
preserve at maturity the bond plus the premium for the remainderman,167 although there is a minority holding contra.168 In this case
there is no reason to distinguish the bonds from wasting property, in
165 See: Edgerton, "Premiums and Discounts in Trust Accounts," 3 I HARV. L.
REV. 447 (1918). Cases collected in 4 A.L.R. 1249 (.1919); 16 A.L.R. 527
(1922); 48 A.L.R. 689 (1927); IOI A.L.R. I (1936). Notes: 34 MicH. L. REV.
448 (1936); 45 YALE L. J. 156 (1935); 36 MICH. L. REV. 514 (1938).
166 Appeal of Connecticut Trust Co. and Safe Deposit, 80 Conn. 540, 69 A. 360
(1908); Higgins v. Beck, II6 Me. 127, 100 A. 553 (1917); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass. 446 (1883); Ballantine v. Young, 74 N. J. Eq. 572, 70 A. 668
(1908); affd. 76 N. J. Eq. 613, 75 A. IIOO (1910); McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. Y.
179, 48 N.E. 548 (1897). Contra: Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174
(1914).
. 167 Estate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209 (1921); Curtis v. Osborn,
79 Conn. 555, 65 A. 968 (1907); New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532,
4 N. E. 69 (1886); Ballantine v. Young, 79 N.J. Eq. 76, 81 A. II9 (19.11); New
York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Baker, 165 N. Y. 484, 59 N. E. 257 (1901); Catherwood's Estate, 22 Pa. Dist. 517 (1913); In re Allis's Estate, 123 Wis. 223, IOI N.
w. 365 (1904).
168 Meyer v. Simonsen, 5 De G. & Sm. 723, 64 Eng. Rep. 1316 (1852); Rite's
Devisees v. Hites Extr., 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892).
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which situation there is amortization. If, however, the purchase was
directed by the party creating the interests, it is the same as if the
bonds themselves had been turned over and there is no amortization.169
Illogically enough, if after amortization has begun the trustee sells the
bonds for more than he paid, the amortization fund still remains principal.110 Callable bonds raise a special problem where they are purchased. In Matter of Brewster111 the trustee in 1929 bought $II,187.50
in bonds to mature in 1947 subject to call at $10,500, par being
$10,000. The bonds were called in 1935. The trustee had amortized
the $1,187.50 at one-eighteenth per year, a total of $464.41, which
added to $10,500 left a balance of $226.09 loss in principal. This
was held chargeable to income on the theory that amortization was
to be to the call date if that preceded maturity sufficiently to leave
an unamortized amount. This was contra to an earlier case in the
same jurisdiction on the same facts.112 Matter of Brewster follows
accepted banking and accounting practice.178 But the rule of amortization to the call date has been denied in the case of preferred stock.174
The distinction is sound, since a date of maturity is usually missing.
In the case of a bond, a calculation can be masfe with the maturity date
as a basis and that calculation can be adjusted if the bond is called.
This is not the case with stock, the whole matter being undefined until
the call date.
The rule as to discounts is the same as with regard to premiums
where the bonds were part of the principal at the time of the creation
of the interests, namely, the life tenant gets the interest, the remainderman in the case of a premium taking a loss but in the case of a discount making a gain.
The rule is different as to discounts in the case of purchases made by
169

Shaw v. Cordis, 143 Mass. 443, 9 N.E. 794 (1887).

170 New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532, 4 N.E. 69 (1886). cf.
Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N.E. 174 (1914).
171 163 Misc. 820, 298 N.Y.S. 761 (1937). Accord: Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comstock, 290 Mass. 377, 195 N.E. 389 (1935).
172 Farwell v. Tweddle, IO Abb. N.C. (N.Y.) 94 (1881). See note in IOI
A.L.R. 1 at 7 (1936).
178 RoLLINs, MoNEY AND INVESTMENTS, 7th ed., 60 (1928); HATFIELD, AccouNTING, 90 (1928).
174 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, 290 Mass. 377, 195 N.E. 389 (1935).
This was a rather unusual case, involving two lots of bonds bought at a premium (one
with a call date), callable preferred stock and bonds at a discount. The premium
bonds were held amortizable to the call date in one case and to the maturity date in
the other. The stock was held not amortizable and the accumulation on bonds bought
at a discount did not go to the life tenant.
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a trustee. In the case of premiums there is amortization in favor of the
remainderman; in the case of discounts the remainderman takes the
accumulation.175 In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock,1 76 the court
recognized the correlative logic of giving the life tenant the accumulation in the case of a discount, just as the remainderman received the
amortized sum in the case of the premium, but refused to so hold on
practical grounds because the discount is not realized until the bonds
are paid. This would argue against giving the life tenant anything
until the bonds are paid. At the date of payment of the bonds the
life tenant may not be the one to be chiefly benefited. Selling below
the par value may be due to other factors besides the rate of interest
and since the risk is on the remainderman he should get the gain. The
court's reasoning is a case of petitio principii,177 it seems, because the
converse argument would be possible with regard to a premium,
namely, not all of the premium might be due to a favorable interest
rate position but part might be due to the gilt-edge character of the
bonds.
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock,118 both premiums and discount existed. Might not the tenant argue that it is only fair to him
to have an offset rather than to niake him lose in both cases?
If the settlor directs that the whole matter of premiums and discounts should be left to the discretion of the trustee, that will be given
effect.179 This is a common practice and may serve to eliminate unfairness in a particular case by requiring the trustee to follow the local
rule.
Again, in the case of legal interests, there should be no accumulation (just as there was no amortization) because the·specific res was
turned over.
B. The Restatement of Trusts
The Restatement of Trusts, section 239, comment f, and section
240, cor;nment h, follows the case law as just expounded ( except that
the distinction between shares turned over to the trustee and shares
purchased by the trustee is not recognized, all shares coming under the
175 Est_ate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209 (1921); In re Houston's
will, 19 Del. Ch. 207, 165 A. 132 (1933); Woord v. Davis, 168 Ga. 504, 148 S.E.
330 (1929); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, 290 Mass. 377, 195 N.E. 389
(1935); Townsend v. United States Trust Co., 3 Red£. Surr. (N.Y.) 220 (1877).
176 290 Mass. 377, 195 N.E. 389 (1935).
·
177 However, 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 240.3, p. 1353 (1939), agrees with the court
on the risk basis.
. 178 290 Mass. 377, 195 N.E. 389 (1935).
179 Kemp v. Macready, 165 App. Div. 124, 150 N:Y.S. 618 (1914).
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latter rule) with three additional significant remarks. Each comment
indicates an affirmative answer to the question whether, where bonds
have been purchased both at a premium and at a discount, they might
be set off one against the other in the case of purchased bonds. Secondly,
where the bond in a discount situation has been paid and it appears that
the discount was due solely to differences in the interest rate, comment
h suggests that it may be in the discretion of the trustee to pay the
accumulation to the life tenant. Thirdly, in section 239, it is suggested
that the trustee can escape the difficulties of amortization by selling
the bonds.

C. Uniform Principal and Income Act
The Uniform Principal and Income Act, section 6,180 in the final
draft makes no differentiation between premiums and discounts. All
gain or loss over inventory value where the bonds are part of the estate
or cost price where they are purchased by a trustee is to fall on principal. This rule applies whether the bonds are held to maturity or
sold.
In the first draft of the Uniform Principal and Income Act1 81 the
provisions were more detailed. The general rule was as finally enacted,
but there were two provisos. First, "Where in the judgment of the
trustee it shall appear that the number or the amount of the premiums
over or discounts under the par or maturity value of such bonds or
obligations with reference to the entire estate is such that the principal
over a period of years ~ill be reduced or increased in a substantial
amount," amortization would be followed. The second proviso was
that the judgment of the trustee should be subject to review. In a
note this section is explained. The effort was to do away with the great
labor involved in such calculations where the result was insignificant.
This was changed in the second draft182 into substantially its final form.
The decision to eliminate any provision for amortization or accumulation was based on a survey made the year previously by the committee. That survey showed that the majority of trust companies never
amortized, and the general opinion seemed to be that premiums and
discounts about balanced in any given estate. Wherever amortization
was practiced it was only because the result would be substantial. The
survey involved thirty-nine trust companies in nineteen cities in fifteen
states.
180
181
182

1931 HANDBOOK NATL. CoNF.
1928 id. 21 I (italics added).
I 929 id. 290.
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